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is largely irrelevant, for they are products of a liberal culture which emphasizes
precisely this sort of ambiguity. In short, if "distance" in the latter sense is
essential to morality, then it would seem to me that (until quite recently) very
few of those mystics who have interpreted their experiences in I-Thou categories
have been moral-a conclusion which I find hard to accept.
It would be unfair to conclude on a negative note. The issues which Home
raises are important, and a number of his observations and distinctions are
suggestive. In particular, serious consideration should be given to his central
thesis, viz., that while mysticism can enhance morality by providing it with
depth and motivation, the sources of moral life are largely non-mystical, and
that mysticism by itself is insufficient to support morality. I suspect that this
may be true. In any case it deserves our attention.

Epistemology: The Justification o/Belie/, by David L. Wolfe, InterVarsity Press,
1983, pp. 92. $3.95.

Reviewed by JAMES A. KELLER, Wofford College.
This book is in the Contours o/Christian Philosophy series of "short introductory-level textbooks in the various fields of philosophy." Its style should be of
great help in communicating with beginning-level students, for it is simply and
clearly written and employs well chosen examples to clarify difficult points.
Moreover, the author makes a serious effort to grasp the attention and interest
of the intended readers by focusing on an issue about which college undergraduates might have doubts and on which techniques for assessing beliefs might
be welcomed. Thus there is no consideration of Gettier-type problems, and one
hears nothing of bam-facades or of grebes. Nor does one find the problem of
proving that an external world exists, only its notation as a problem which did
not arouse the interest of undergraduates (p. 14). Instead. the primary focus is
on religious and metaphysical beliefs (p. 18), which also provide the most
common source of illustrations. Nevertheless, the argument and conclusions
would be applicable to issues other than these, though more copious use of other
issues as illustrations might help drive home this point with beginning undergraduates.
Although, as Wolfe notes, epistemology traditionally was defined as "the
study of the possibility and nature of knowledge" (p. 14), the book is not
concerned with knowledge but with justified belief, or more precisely with what
is involved in showing that a belief is justified or "to put it somewhat differently"
that our assertions are warranted (p. 15). He promises to return later to the
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question of how warrant relates to knowledge (p. 17), but I could not find any
place where he did so. The book, then, is a sustained consideration of the question
of how we can show that our beliefs are justified or our assertions are warranted.
It is worth noting that he tends to confuse or equate the question of when we
are justified and the question of when we can show that we are justified in a
certain belief. 1 Though these may be equivalent questions in some epistemologies,
they are not in general equivalent, and certainly no advocate of externalist theories
of justification will accept their equivalence.
After a brief introductory chapter in which he articulates the problem, Wolfe
discusses four historically important views on how beliefs are justified: (I) Pure
Rationalism (e.g., Descartes); (2) Immediate Experience (Naive Empiricism);
(3) Reasoning from Experience (Inferential Empiricism); and (4) Critical Interpretation. Each of these views is clearly explained and criticized. In light of the
criticisms of each of these views, Wolfe poses the possibility of relativism at
the end of the chapter.
In the next chapter, he tries to answer the challenge of relativism. He accepts
Quine'S picture of our beliefs as forming an interconnected web whose interior
portions comprise an interpretive scheme or framework, and he tries to answer
three questions about assessing such interpretive schemes: (1) How is it possible
to gain non-arbitrary criteria to appraise such schemes? (2) "How can experience
be of any help in assessing an interpretive scheme if experience itself is interpreted
in light of that scheme?" and (3) If conclusive verification for a scheme is not
possible, what sort of standing can one ascribe to a warranted scheme? He
answers (1) that criteria emerge in the clarification of tasks. If one's task is to
make sense out of one's total experience (the metaphysical task), then the appropriate criteria for one's interpretive scheme are internal consistency and coherence
(without which one does not have a system of assertions at all) and comprehensiveness and congruency (without which one's system of assertions will not
interpret one's total experience). Furthermore, he claims, individual beliefs (assertions) are justified (assessed) only by assessing the scheme to which they
belong (pp. 57-58). (Here I would demur. It seems to me that assessing the
scheme is at most a necessary condition and not in general a sufficient condition
for assessing individual assertions-a point to which I shall return.)
He answers (2) above by furnishing several examples of experiences changing
a person's beliefs. He provides an account of what happens in these cases by
recurring to Quine's web analogy. When a person is faced with an experience
(or more commonly, a series of experiences) which she cannot assimilate, she
may do one of several things, including changing her system of beliefs. It seems
to me that here again clarity requires that one distinguish between assessing (or
changing) a system of beliefs and assessing (or changing) a single belief framed
within a system, for these two issues have far different implications for the
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problem being discussed. Indeed the problem arises only in relation to the first
issue. For example, belief in a physical world (an interpretive framework) is not
affected by believing or not believing that a tree is in a certain location. And
Christian theism (another interpretive scheme) is not affected by believing or
not believing that God comforted me on some particular occasion. The belief
about the tree and the belief about God logically require the truth of certain
interpretive frameworks, but the frameworks are not affected by the truth or
falsity of these beliefs. Thus, assessing the frameworks will not be sufficient to
enable us to assess the particular beliefs. And beginning students (and other
laypersons) may well wonder how these beliefs should be assessed.
In his answer to question (3), Wolfe's debt to Popper, already apparent at
several places, becomes especially clear. Interpretive schemes cannot be verified,
but they can be falsified. Those which have been subjected to criticism and have
survived the criticism may be said to be corroborated or "plausible or even
probable (in a nonmathematical sense)" (p. 65). Wolfe does not subject this
falsificationist approach to any critical evaluation, though the problems with
falsificationism arising from the problems with treating basic statements (i.e.,
statements about particular events and individuals) as falsifiable are too well
known to need rehearsal here. 2 This omission is, of course, quite consistent with
his failure to deal with the assessment of statements about particular events.
As an overall strategy for the reader to arrive at a warranted interpretive
scheme, Wolfe proposes:
Start where you are. Continue with (or choose, depending on where
you are) the interpretive scheme which is personally the most important
or interesting to you and pursue it as long as it does not succumb to
active criticism. (p. 68)
He adds that in doing this, one should actively seek dialogue with adherents of
other schemes in order to subject one's own scheme to criticism.
Wolfe's final chapter considers the relation between the foregoing epistemological conclusions and the Christian faith. He begins by claiming that all our beliefs
(common-sense, scientific, religious, ideological, etc.) are risky hypotheses
which can be warranted only as they are subjected to appropriate criticism and
survive it. Thus faith is inherent in all human cognitive enterprises, for we are
always committing ourselves to beliefs and actions where we lack complete
verification of the beliefs. Rationality in beliefs does not require that we never
make such commitments, but that we always be open to criticism of our beliefs.
Is such openness consistent with Christian faith? Wolfe answers that it is, for
such openness merely involves admitting that one's beliefs might be wrong, not
admitting that they are wrong. He adds, though, that the believer need not seek
to disprove his beliefs with the same systematic purpose that characterizes the
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scientist (at least as falsificationists describe the scientist); it is enough if the
believer lives on the basis of his faith and is open to seeing inadequacies in his
beliefs.
As an introduction to epistemology, this book has clarity, simplicity, and
focus on a single issue of interest to undergraduates as its great strengths. On
the other hand, this single focus also means that other important epistemological
issues are slighted. Thus, Wolfe's book is nowhere near as comprehensive as
Chisholm's Theory of Knowledge in the Prentice-Hall series of introductory
books. But Wolfe's book is also simpler and considerably shorter than
Chisholm's; making it significantly more comprehensive would make it a different
book. On the other hand, even within its length and focus, I found some matters
troubling. Two of these I have already discussed: the failure to consider the
assessment of statements about individual events and the equation (confusion)
of whether one is justified with whether one can show that one is justified. To
these I would add a third: the understanding of foundationalism as requiring
incorrigible and absolutely certain foundations (p. 58). While this was often true
historically (certainly of such figures as Descartes and Spinoza), there are more
modest foundationalisms which require only that a foundational belief have some
immediate justifiedness-i.e., some justifiedness independent of other beliefs.
But the belief's justifiedness is limited and defeasible; nevertheless, the belief
is foundational because it is immediately justified to some extent and because
it plays a part in the justification of non-foundational beliefs. J My criticisms are
not unrelated. One of the central arguments for foundationalism is its ability to
stop epistemic regress; often it does so at beliefs about individual events which
are (purportedly) immediately justified. And one of the central criticisms of
foundationalism is the purported dogmatism involved in accepting any belief
which is not justified in tem1S of other beliefs. But often this criticism rests on
the refusal to make the distinction between being justified in a belief and showing
that one is justified in a belief. 4 It seems to me that some consideration of these
matters would have resulted in a more balanced and useful book without greatly
increasing its size.

NOTES
I. Cf., e.g., his statement on p. 16 that "the degree to which we are justified in our beliefs about
this seems to be dependent on examining available reasons." But does it not depend on the reasons
themselves, rather than on our examining them?
2. Cf., e.g., Harold I. Brown, Perception, Theory and Commitment: The New Philosophy of Science
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), chp. 5.
3. A number of recent authors have articulated versions of modest foundationalism, among them
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Robert Audi in several of his papers; cf., e.g., "Foundationalism, Epistemic Dependence, and
Defeasibility," Synthese, 55 (1983), 119-39, esp. pp. 128-30. This and other issues raised in my
critical comments are also illuminated in William P. Alston, "Two Types of Foundationalism," The
Journal of Philosophy, LXXIII, 7 (April 8, 1976), 165-85.
4. Cf. Alston's article cited in the previous note.

Is God a Creationist?, ed. by Roland M. Frye. New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons. $15.95, paper $9.95.
Reviewed by FREDERICK J. CROSSON, University of Notre Dame.
Despite the rather odd title, this is a useful collection of eleven essays, drawn
from diverse sources (conferences, magazines, books) and stitched together by
an editorial prologue and epilogue. Six of the pieces address the creationist
controversy directly, the others deal with the relations of science and religion
or with scriptural exegesis (especially of Genesis 1-3). Five of the essays are by
physical scientists and three by scripture scholars.
The occasion for the book, as for its first six essays, is the appearance on the
American scene of "creation science" or creationism. Vigorously pressed by its
supporters-mostly through state legislature--creation science is presented as
an alternative theory to evolution in accounting for the origin of living forms
and of the fossil record. As an alternative theory, its supporters have sought to
gain access for it to the way in which biology is taught, especially on the high
school level. The most recent case involved an Arkansas law of 1981 which
required that equal time be given to creation science wherever evolution was
taught in the schools. In 1982 a Federal District Court found the law unconstitutional on the grounds that, being specifically linked to the Bible, the mandated
teaching represented an establishment of religion.
In an attempt to deflect this interpretation of the law in advance, the defendants
filed a "Findings of Fact" which included this extraordinary claim:
Creation-science does presuppose the existence of a creator, to the same
degree that evolution-science presupposes the existence of no creator.
As used in the context of creation-science, as defined by 54(a) (sic) of
Act 590, the terms or concepts of "creation" and "creator" are not
inherently religious terms or concepts. In this sense, the term "creator"
means only some entity with power, intelligence, and a sense of design_
Creation-science does not require a creator who has a personality, who
has the attributes of love, compassion, justice, etc., which are ordinarily
attributed to a diety. Indeed, the creation-science model does not require
that the creator still be in existence.

